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Sovereign Loss in Syria & Sudan: Dollarization and Parallel Entities | Media Arabic Booster 11/25
When does a currency lose its “sovereignty” (سِيادَة)? And what does it mean when a state rejects “parallel entities” (كِيانات مُوازِيَة)? This Media Arabic Booster dissects two stories of failing authority: the “undeclared dollarization” eating away at the Syrian economy (al-Modon), and Egypt’s diplomatic stance on the war in Sudan (Al-Masry Al-Youm).
How does the media talk about a state losing control? The Media Arabic Booster November 2025 episode explores the language of “sovereignty” (سِيادَة) in crisis, looking at it from two angles: one political, one economic.
First, we see a state’s authority collapsing in Sudan. The brutal civil war has forced Egypt to publicly reject “parallel entities”. We’ll break down an Al-Masry Al-Youm headline to understand this critical diplomatic language.
Media Arabic Booster: 11-25 Show
Second, we see a currency’s authority collapsing in Syria. An article from al-Modon investigates the “undeclared dollarization” (دَوْلَرَةٌ غَيْرُ مُعْلَنَةٍ) that is killing the Syrian lira. We’ll give you the key Arabic words to see how the news reports on both kinds of failure.
Let’s start our Media Arabic lesson.
A close look at a headline
In this edition of Media Arabic Booster, we will begin our analysis with a critical diplomatic phrase used by Egypt to describe the crisis in neighboring Sudan.
Al-Masry Al-Youm: Egypt and Sudan
On November 9, 2025, Al‑Masry Al‑Youm (المصري اليوم) reported that Egypt reaffirmed support for Sudan’s territorial unity and institutions, rejected parallel entities, and called for an immediate comprehensive ceasefire.
The regime in Cairo is pressing – through bilateral talks and a quadripartite mechanism – for humanitarian pauses, open aid corridors, and international action.
Let’s focus on the headline:
مصر تتمسك برفض الكيانات الموازية في السودان
Literal: Egypt insists on rejecting the parallel entities in Sudan.
Natural/idiomatic: Egypt remains firm in rejecting parallel power structures in Sudan.
«عبدالعاطي»: موقفنا ثابت.. ندعم وحدة الأراضي واستقرار المؤسسات | خبيرة لـ«المصري اليوم»: القاهرة تهدف لوضع القضية ضمن الأجندة الدولية
Literal: ‘Abdel‑Aty: Our position is fixed.. we support the unity of the lands and the stability of institutions | Expert to Al‑Masry Al‑Youm: Cairo aims to put the issue on the international agenda.
Natural/idiomatic: ‘Abdel‑Aty: Our position is firm – we support Sudan’s territorial unity and institutional stability.| An expert told Al‑Masry Al‑Youm that Cairo aims to place the issue on the international agenda.
Remark: If you cannot access the article, try this link (archive.org)
War in Sudan: Who’s Backing Who (late-2025)
The conflict in Sudan (السودان) pits the official Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF – الجيش السوداني), led by Abdel Fattah al-Burhan (عبد الفتاح البرهان), against the powerful paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF -قوات الدعم السريع), led by Mohamed “Hemedti” Dagalo (محمد حمدان دقلو حميدتي).
The war began in April 2023, when a power struggle between al-Burhan’s SAF and Hemedti’s RSF erupted into open fighting over control of the military and transition arrangements. In late October-November 2025 (around 26 October 2025), the RSF captured El-Fasher (الفاشر), the army’s last major hub in Darfur (دارفور), triggering warnings of mass killings and famine.
Why the RSF Has External Support
The RSF’s control of gold-producing areas and smuggling routes has created lucrative revenue streams.
- Investigations and policy analyses show the UAE (الإمارات) is a major commercial hub for that gold and has been linked in reporting to political and transactional ties with RSF figures; some reports explicitly accuse UAE-linked actors of providing military/logistical support, though the UAE officially denies arming the militia.
- These ties help the RSF finance and equip itself.
- Separately, reporting links Russian private military networks (like Wagner-style actors) to past assistance and access to mining revenues in RSF-controlled areas.
Why the SAF Has Backers
Egypt (مصر) backs the SAF (الجيش السوداني) for strategic reasons.
- Sudan’s stability and control over its long southern border are existential security concerns for Cairo.
- Egypt’s military-led government prefers a formal, institutional army over paramilitary rule and views the collapse of state authority in Sudan as a direct national security threat.
Who’s Brokering Peace and Why
Saudi Arabia (السعودية) and the United States (الولايات المتحدة) are the main external mediators, having led the (currently stalled) diplomatic process known as the Jeddah platform (منبر جدة).
- The US has also used sanctions to target financial and arms networks tied to both warring parties.
- The primary goal for these mediators is to stop mass starvation, restore humanitarian access, and prevent the conflict from spilling over and destabilizing the wider Red Sea region.
- Estimates suggest that by late 2025 the war has displaced more than 12 million people and caused at least 150,000 deaths (from violence, starvation, and disease); all figures remain provisional because access is limited and counting is difficult.
Translation of an article
Let’s look at parts of a longer newspaper article in Arabic. We will translate each sentence carefully. The highlighted words are in the vocabulary list below.
al-Modon: The Dollarization in Syria
On November 7, 2025, the online news platform al-Modon (المدن) published this long and complex article about the economic crisis in Syria. It investigates how the Syrian government itself is driving “undeclared dollarization” (دَوْلَرَةٌ غَيْرُ مُعْلَنَةٍ) by issuing fines and paying salaries in dollars.
This is a challenging workout, but mastering its high-level vocabulary will pay off for all your future reading, as it explores whether the Syrian lira has lost its “sovereignty” (سِيادَة).
Al-Modon (المدن) is an independent Arabic online newspaper founded in 2012 and based in Beirut, Lebanon. The platform is known for its critical, in-depth analysis of politics and culture across the Levant. Politically, it is generally seen as liberal and secular, with an editorial line that is strongly critical of the Assad regime in Syria and other authoritarian governments.
Remark: If you cannot access the article, try this link (archive.org)
Let’s now take a closer look at the entire article.
Section 1
لا تنتهج الحكومة السورية خطاً محدداً في عملة التداول خلال تعاملاتها الرسمية وشبه الرسمية. فالدولار يتغلب على الليرة السورية في تعاملات كثيرة، بينها سداد رواتب “البيروقراطية الجديدة” وجباية بعض الفواتير وتسعير قسم من المخالفات. أما الليرة السورية فتبقى عملة التداول الرسمية شكلاً لا فعلاً، لأن كل شيء في سوريا الجديدة يُسعّر بالدولار، بدءاً من الدولرة غير المعلنة التي كانت سمة اقتصاد الحرب، وصولاً إلى دخول البلاد مرحلة جديدة تقوم على دولرة رسمية معلنة منذ سقوط النظام، وهو الأمر الذي يؤثر سلبياً على العملة الوطنية وقيمتها في السوق.
The Syrian government does not follow a specific line (course/policy) regarding the currency used in its official and semi-official transactions. The dollar prevails over the Syrian pound in many transactions, including the payment of salaries to the “new bureaucracy,” the collection of some bills (fees), and the pricing of some fines. The Syrian pound remains the official currency in form, not in fact (in name only), as everything in the new Syria is priced in dollars, starting with the undeclared dollarization that characterized the war economy, and extending to the country’s entry into a new phase based on officially declared dollarization since the fall of the regime, which negatively affects the national currency and its value in the market.
رصدت “المدن” حزمة من الدولرة الرسمية للغرامات وإيصالات القبض والمناقصات التي يُعتمَد الدولار فيها عوضاً عن الليرة سواء على نحوٍ إجباري أو اختياري. وأبرز هذه القرارات كان التعميم الذي أصدره مدير التنمية الإدارية هادي الأحمد، بالتفويض عن محافظ دمشق مروان إدلبي، بمنع التدخين في المكاتب والممرات، إضافة إلى أي مكان تابع لمديريات القطاع البلدي والأمانة العامة والخدمات الفنية، تحت طائلة الحبس والغرامة.
Al-Modon newspaper documented a series of official dollarization measures for fines, receipts, and tenders, in which the dollar is used instead of the Syrian pound, either mandatorily or optionally. The most prominent of these decisions was the circular issued by the Director of Administrative Development, Hadi al-Ahmad, on behalf of the Governor of Damascus, Marwan Idlibi, prohibiting smoking in offices and corridors, as well as in any place belonging to the directorates of the municipal sector, the General Secretariat, and technical services, under penalty of imprisonment and a fine.
وحدد القرار غرامة لا تقل عن 100 دولار ولا تزيد عن 200 دولار، في حال التدخين في أحد الأماكن العامة المحظور التدخين فيها، فضلًا عن غرامة تتراوح بين 1000 دولار و3000 في حال سماح المسؤول عن المكان العام المحظور لأي شخص بالتدخين، وفي حال عدم الإعلان عن منع التدخين في المكان العام المستهدف بالقرار.
The decision stipulated a fine of no less than $100 and no more than $200 for smoking in any public place where smoking is prohibited, in addition to a fine ranging from $1,000 to $3,000 if the person responsible for the prohibited public place allows anyone to smoke, or if the prohibition of smoking is not announced in the public place targeted by the decision.
وفي إجراء حكومي آخر، حدّدت وزارة الطاقة قيمة التأمينات الأولية المتعلقة بمناقصة توريد 6 مليون عداد ذكي، بالدولار أو ما يعادله. ونلاحظ الإجراء عينه في مناقصة أخرى حول توريد الغاز المنزلي. فقد حُدّدت طريقة الدفع بالدولار بموجب شيك مُصدّق. أما بخصوص الرواتب، فتسلّم الحكومة قسماً كبيراً منها بالدولار عبر تطبيق “شام كاش” الذي تأسس سابقاً في إدلب، وجرى افتتاح مقر رئيس له وسط دمشق.
In another government measure, the Ministry of Energy specified the value of the initial guarantees related to a tender for the supply of 6 million smart meters in dollars or its equivalent. We observe the same procedure in another tender concerning the supply of household gas. The payment method was specified as US dollars via a certified check. As for salaries, the government pays a large portion of them in dollars through the “Sham Cash” application, which was previously established in Idlib, and a main headquarters for it was opened in central Damascus.
Section 2
تداول الدولار كان ممنوعاً في القوانين السورية التي سقطت مع الإعلان الدستوري الجديد في سوريا. وأبرز تلك القوانين التي كانت الناظمة لمجال التداول هو المرسوم رقم “3” للعام 2020 الذي فرض عقوبة السجن ودفع غرامة مالية للمتعاملين بغير الليرة السورية، وهو مرسوم جاء معدِّلاً للمادة الثانية من المرسوم التشريعي رقم “54” للعام 2013، الذي كان يعاقب المتعامل بغير الليرة بالحبس من ثلاثة أشهر إلى ثلاث سنوات ويغرّمه مبالغ طائلة.
Trading in US dollars was prohibited under Syrian laws that fell (were superseded) by the new constitutional declaration in Syria. The most prominent of these laws governing currency exchange was Decree No. 3 of 2020, which imposed imprisonment and a fine on those dealing in currencies other than the Syrian pound. This decree amended Article Two of Legislative Decree No. 54 of 2013, which punished those dealing in currencies other than the Syrian pound with imprisonment from three months to three years and imposed hefty fines.
لم تصدر قوانين أو مراسيم جديدة ناظمة لعمليات التداول بديلة عن تلك التي سقطت مع النظام السابق. ولكن واقع الانفتاح المالي الذي رسّخته السلطات الجديدة في سوريا فرض نفسه، وفتح الباب أمام التعامل بالدولار إلى جانب العملة الوطنية في الكثير من التعاملات.
No new laws or decrees regulating currency exchange have been issued to replace those that fell (were abolished) with the previous regime. However, the reality of financial openness established by the new authorities in Syria has imposed itself, opening the door to dealing in dollars alongside the national currency in many transactions.
المحامي والمستشار القانوني، غزوان قرنفل قال لـِ “المدن”، إنّ جباية الغرامات والإلزامات المالية بغير العملة الوطنية يعتبر شكلاً من أشكال الاعتداء على مفهوم السيادة، باعتبار أن العملة الوطنية هي إحدى الرموز السيادية، مشيراً إلى أنه من المؤسف أن من ينتهكها هو السلطة المنوط بها حماية السيادة الوطنية.
Lawyer and legal consultant Ghazwan Qarnafal told Al-Modon that collecting fines and financial obligations in a currency other than the national currency is a form of assault on the concept of sovereignty, considering that the national currency is one of the symbols of sovereignty. He pointed out that it is unfortunate that those who violate it are the authorities entrusted with protecting national sovereignty.
ومع أنه يشير إلى أنه لا يجوز لدولة تحترم نفسها وسيادتها أن تتعامل بعملة غير عملتها الوطنية. لكنه يلمح إلى ضرورة تعديل القانون المجرِّم للتعامل بغير الليرة، لجهة حيازة العملات الأجنبية وتداولها، لأن القوانين السابقة لا تزال قائمة، وليس هناك قوانين جديدة لاغية لها.
While he indicates that a state that respects itself and its sovereignty should not deal in a currency other than its national currency, he suggests the need to amend the law criminalizing dealing in currencies other than the Syrian pound, regarding the possession and trading of foreign currencies, because the previous laws are still in effect, and there are no new laws repealing them.
Section 3
الجانب القانوني في القضية لا يعدّ مشكلة، نظراً إلى انتهاج العهد الجديد مساراً مختلفاً يسمح بحريّة التداول. التأثيرات الأكبر لعملية الدولرة المعلنة هي الأهم، لأنها تُفقِد الليرة السورية قيمتها، وتُحفّز الطلب على الدولار، خصوصاً أنّ الحكومة السورية لم تُقدِم حتّى الآن على تنظيم السوق المالية، وبينها شبكة واسعة من شركات الصرافة يُنظر إليها كسوق موازية تتعامل بمختلف العملات، وأهمها الدولار واليورو، بأريحية تامة.
The legal aspect of the issue is not considered a problem, given that the new era (regime) is pursuing a different path that allows for free trading. The greater impacts of the declared dollarization process are more significant, as it devalues the Syrian lira and stimulates demand for the dollar, especially since the Syrian government has not yet regulated the financial market, including a wide network of exchange companies that are viewed as a parallel market dealing in various currencies, most importantly the dollar and the euro, with complete ease (freedom).
من هذا المنطلق، يلاحظ الباحث ومدير منصة “اقتصادي” يونس الكريم وجود تداعيات عديدة لهذا الإجراء المنتشر على نحوٍ اعتيادي، في ما كان يعرف بالمناطق المحررة سابقاً، والذي بدأت ملامحه تظهر في المناطق الأخرى التي كانت واقعة سابقاً تحت سيطرة النظام المخلوع.
From this perspective, researcher and director of the “Iqtisadi” platform, Younis Al-Karim, notes the existence of numerous repercussions of this measure, which is becoming commonplace in what were formerly known as the liberated areas, and whose features are beginning to appear in other areas that were previously under the control of the ousted regime.
ويلفت الكريم خلال حديث إلى”المدن” إلى وجود حزمة مخالفات متنوّعة في هذه الإجراءات، إحداها تتمثل في التعدّي على مهام وزارة المالية المخوّلة إصدار هذه القرارات، والثانية أنّ تسليم بعض هذه الغرامات يتمّ إما عبر المؤسسة أو أحد البنوك العامة مثل مصرف التسليف الشعبي غير المخوّل أساساً بالتعامل بالدولار.
During an interview with “Al-Modon,” Al-Karim points out a range of violations in these procedures. One is the encroachment on the responsibilities of the Ministry of Finance, which is authorized to issue such decisions. The second is that some of these fines are collected either through the institution itself or one of the public banks, such as the Popular Credit Bank, which is not authorized to deal in dollars.
ونظراً إلى عشوائية هذه القرارات وعدم التزامها النظام العام، فإنّها تؤشّر إلى أن الأساس الاقتصادي والإداري للمرحلة لا يقوم على حوكمة واضحة ومراعاة لمبدأ الشفافية، وهو الأمر الذي يعني تحويل المؤسسات من نظام واضح يمكن قراءته من قبل المواطن والمستثمر على السواء، إلى نشاط شبكي يقوم على مزاجية الفرد لا قرارات المؤسسة، وعلى عوامل القربى والولاء بدلاً من تفعيل الدور المؤسساتي للدولة، وفقاً لما يضيفه الكريم.
Given the arbitrary nature of these decisions and their disregard for public order, they indicate that the economic and administrative foundation of this phase is not based on clear governance and adherence to the principle of transparency. This means transforming institutions from a clear system that can be understood by both citizens and investors into a network activity based on individual whims rather than institutional decisions, and on factors of kinship and loyalty instead of activating the institutional role of the state, as Al-Karim adds.
ومن جانب آخر، يشير الكريم إلى أثر إيجابي لهذه الإجراءات لجهة رفد الخزانة العامة بالقطع الأجنبي. لكن الجانب السلبي يتغلب على هذه الإيجابية. فسحب الدولار يرفع سعره ويؤثر سلبياً على قيمة الليرة السورية، والطبيعة المزاجية للمخالفات وتسعيرها الفج بالدولار الذي لا يملكه معظم المواطنين يعزز من خسارة ثقة المواطن بالدولة، وهي ثقة مهمة جداً لتنشيط الاقتصاد وتحفيز الفاعلين الاقتصاديين على ضخ الرساميل الكبيرة في مشاريع طويلة الأمد.
On the other hand, Al-Karim points to a positive effect of these measures in terms of replenishing the public treasury with foreign currency. However, the negative aspects outweigh the positive ones. The withdrawal of dollars from the market increases their price and negatively impacts the value of the Syrian pound. The arbitrary nature of the fines and their crude stark pricing in dollars, a currency that most citizens do not possess, reinforces [deepens] the loss of public trust in the state (further erodes public trust), a trust that is crucial for stimulating the economy and encouraging economic actors to invest significant capital in long-term projects.
Section 4
لا تقتصر الدولرة على تسعير بعض الغرامات والمخالفات؛ بل تأخذ مساحة أوسع بكثير، سواء عبر تسليم كتلة ضخمة من رواتب وزارتي الدفاع والداخلية والإعلام بالدولار، أو عبر اعتماد الدولار كوسيلة تسعير للسلعة وللتحويلات المالية في بعض البنوك، وعلى رأسها “شام كاش” الذي لا تزال الضبابية تكتنف توسعاته الجديدة وحجمه السوقي.
Dollarization is not limited to pricing some fines and penalties; it extends to a much wider scope, whether through the payment of a large portion of the salaries of the Ministries of Defense, Interior, and Information in dollars, or through the adoption of the dollar as a pricing mechanism for goods and financial transfers in some banks, and chief among them [lit. at their head] “Sham Cash,” as ambiguity still surrounds its new expansions and its market size.
ويرصد يونس الكريم ثلاثة من الرواتب في سوريا في المناطق التي تديرها الحكومة السورية: رواتب الموظفين الحكوميين في دمشق والمحافظات الداخلية وتصرف بالليرة السورية، وهي رواتب منخفضة إذا ما قورنت بالدولار. والرواتب التي تُمنح شمال حلب ذات الإشراف التركي، وهي بالدولار أو الليرة التركية، وتعد متوسطة. أما الكتلة الثالثة فهي رواتب موظفي حكومة الإنقاذ السابقة، وهي الأعلى وهي بالدولار، وتشمل رواتب المقاتلين والأمنيين والإداريين، بمعنى أنها تتضمن رواتب البيروقراطية العسكرية والإدارية الجديدة للعهد الجديد.
Younis al-Karim identifies three types of salaries in Syria in the areas controlled by the Syrian government: salaries of government employees in Damascus and the interior provinces, paid in Syrian pounds, which are low when compared to the dollar. Salaries paid in northern Aleppo, under Turkish supervision, are in dollars or Turkish lira and are considered moderate. The third bloc (category) consists of the salaries of employees of the former Salvation Government, which are the highest and are paid in dollars. These include the salaries of fighters, security personnel, and administrators, meaning they encompass the salaries of the new military and administrative bureaucracy of the new era (regime).
وحول تأثير دولرة الكتلة الأخيرة، وهي الأضخم، على الليرة والاقتصاد، يوضح الكريم صعوبة تقييم هذا الأثر لعدم وجود معطيات واضحة تخبرنا عن حجم الرواتب ونطاقات توزعها. لكن على العموم يبدو حجم الدولرة المعلنة كبيراً وقابلاً للاتساع، لا سيما في حال ضُخَّ القطع الأجنبي إلى البلد عبر منح واستثمارات خارجية. وهذا ما سيؤثر سلباً بالطبع على قيمة الليرة، التي يشير خبراء إلى أنها لا تزال تعامل كأيّة سلعة في السوق، وهو ما يجعلها عرضة لرياح العرض والطلب.
Regarding the impact of the dollarization of this last and largest bloc (category) on the Syrian pound and the economy, al-Karim explains the difficulty in assessing this impact due to the lack of clear data on the size of these salaries and their distribution. However, in general, the announced level of dollarization appears significant and likely to expand, especially if foreign currency is injected into the country through grants and foreign investments. This will, of course, negatively affect the value of the Syrian pound, which experts indicate is still treated like any other commodity in the market, making it vulnerable to the winds [forces] of supply and demand.
Vocabulary list
If you are unfamiliar with the verb system used in the Hans Wehr dictionary (Roman numerals, I-X), click here for a short and simplified overview. To avoid confusion, we generally ignore auxiliary vowels that are necessary for pronunciation to avoid consonant clusters.
Part 1: Analysis of a headline
The following vocabulary list covers the yellow-marked words we saw in the headlines.
| Arabic | Explanation |
|---|---|
| تَمَسَّكَ – يَتَمَسَّكُ (بِـ) | to adhere to, hold on to, cling to, insist on. V-verb. Verbal noun: تَمَسُّكٌ. It is almost always followed by the preposition بِـ (to, on). Examples: مَصْرُ تَتَمَسَّكُ بِرَفْضِ… (Egypt insists on rejecting…). يَتَمَسَّكُ بِالْأَمَلِ (He is holding on to hope). يَجِبُ أَنْ نَتَمَسَّكَ بِمَبادِئِنا (We must adhere to our principles). |
| كِيانٌ pl: كِياناتٌ | entity, being, existence. Verbal noun (مَصْدَرٌ) of the I-verb كانَ – يَكُونُ (to be). Examples: رَفْضُ الْكِياناتِ الْمُوازِيَةِ (rejecting the parallel entities). كِيانٌ سِياسِيٌّ مُسْتَقِلٌّ (An independent political entity). الْكِيانُ الصِّهْيُونِيُّ (the Zionist entity). |
| مُوازٍ | parallel, equivalent. Active participle (اِسْمُ الْفاعِلِ) of the III-verb وازَى – يُوازِي (to be parallel to). Note: This is a defective noun (اِسْمٌ مَنْقُوصٌ). Examples: السُّوقُ الْمُوازِيَةُ (the parallel market). لَدَيْهِ مَسارٌ مِهْنِيٌّ مُوازٍ (He has a parallel career path). |
| خَبِيرٌ pl: خُبَراءُ | expert. Pattern فَعِيلٌ from the I-verb خَبَرَ – يَخْبُرُ (to be familiar with). Note: This word is technically a صِفَةٌ مُشَبَّهَةٌ (adjective resembling the participle) because it comes from an intransitive verb (خَبِرَ – to be experienced) and denotes a stable, inherent quality (expertise). Although this pattern is sometimes grouped with nouns of exaggeration (صِيغَةُ الْمُبَالَغَةِ), its primary morphological classification here is an adjective denoting a permanent trait. Examples: خَبِيرَةٌ لِالْمَصْرِيِّ الْيَوْمِ (a [female] expert to “Al-Masry Al-Youm”). خَبِيرٌ فِي الشُّؤُونِ الْعَسْكَرِيَّةِ (an expert in military affairs). نَحْنُ بِحاجَةٍ إِلَى رَأْيِ خَبِيرٍ (We need an expert’s opinion). |
| قَضِيَّةٌ pl: قَضايا | issue, case (legal), matter, cause. From the I-verb قَضَى – يَقْضِي (to decree, judge). Examples: وَضْعُ الْقَضِيَّةِ ضِمْنَ الْأَجِنْدَةِ (putting the issue on the agenda). الْقَضِيَّةُ الْفِلَسْطِينِيَّةُ (the Palestinian cause). رَفَعَ قَضِيَّةً فِي الْمَحْكَمَةِ (He filed a case in court). |
| ضِمْنَ | within, among, as part of, including. Adverb of place (ظَرْفُ مَكانٍ). From the I-verb ضَمِنَ – يَضْمَنُ (to include). Examples: يَدْخُلُ هَذا ضِمْنَ مَسْؤُولِيّاتِكَ (This falls within your responsibilities). مِنْ ضِمْنِها (among them, including). |
Part 2: Translation of an article
We will now conduct a detailed analysis of all the highlighted terms from the preceding article
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Wanna cite this article?
Drißner, G. (2025, November 30). Sovereign Loss in Syria & Sudan: Dollarization and Parallel Entities | Media Arabic Booster 11/25. Arabic for Nerds. https://arabic-for-nerds.com/learners-corner/media-arabic-booster/media-arabic-booster-11-25/
Published: November 30, 2025
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Publication ISSN: 3055-1730
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